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WHAT-NO AIRPLANES?*
For the last twenty years, by means of both the printed and
spoken word, the American public has been constantly and frequently
informed that, by Armistice Day, November 11, 1918, no American
built "fighting" airplane had ever been flown over the western front
in the World War. With patriotic fervor, the public has for a gen-
eration condemned those responsible for this allegedly tragic situa-
tion. The fact that such a statement ignores both the facts and the
reasons for our wartime policy seemingly remains generally unrecog-
nized. Someone should tell what actually did happen and Why it
happened.
I am, I believe, the only American still alive who possesses com-
plete and first-hand information on all the essential ramifications of-
this subject.
David Lloyd George, war-time Prime Minister of England, in
his recent memoirs adds fuel to the flames by his unqualified state-
ment that General Pershing on February 28, 1918, pointed out in a
telegram to the Government.of the United States that "as a matter
of fact, there is not today a single American-made plane in Europe."
To an interested reading public, this statement might infer that
General Pershing was stating to his Government that America had
been in the war for ten months, and during that time had failed to
produce a single airplane for use on the western front as he,
Pershing, had anticipated, and that the Allies, within the same period
of time, not only could do, but actually had done, a better job in
designing, engineering'and producing airplanes than had America.
*Address delivered by Col. EDGAR S. 0-ORRELL, (formerly Chief of Staff, Air
Corps, A. E. F.) President, Air Transport Association of America, at the Tenth
Annual Convention of the National Association of State Aviation Officials,
Louisville, Kentucky, October 17, 1940.
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Any such inference completely shuns realities. Pershing's war
plans neither depended nor counted upon American built planes of
any type or quantity being on the western front by February, 1918.
It was anticipated by the A.E.F. that such planes would not arrive
before July 1st, 1918. And this anticipation was realized.
Thousands of patriotic Americans, aided by intelligent and'
experienced British, French and Italian advice, faithfully, intelli-
gently and self-sacrificingly contributed to America's program of
war-time aeronautical accomplishments. For it all, much of the
post-war literature contains neither recognition nor commendation.
The authors can find only faults. The reward they offer for honor-
able, faithful and successful service to their country by our country-
men was termed "snarling criticism, fault-finding complaints, and
destructive vituperation," to quote the reply to opposition critics
made by Congressman Clarence F. Lea, of California, in his state-
ment on February 16, 1920, at the close of the Congressional investi-
gation into war-time expenditures.
Every interested American would do well to read Part 2 of
House Report No. 637, 66th Congress, Second Session. This report,
written by Congressman Lea, is the only accurate and truthful Con-
gressional document devoted to the subject under consideration. In
compiling this document, Mr. Lea stated that he was attempting to
set forth exactly what did happen, not that he believed America of
that day would pay any attention to the facts but that, some day
in the future, America might need to know, and might utilize, the
truth. Mr. Lea in 1919 very wisely remarked that probably twenty
years would elapse before Americans would dispassionately consider
the real facts. This prediction, perhaps because of the trouble-
some situation in current World affairs, has now been realized, for
there is today more interest in this House Report than there was even
on the day it was originally submitted.
David Lloyd George, in volume 5 of his War Memoirs, after
devoting a whole chapter to unwarranted criticism of America and
especially to unmerited, inaccurate, and, in some cases, vindicative,
criticism of General Pershing, concludes Chapter II with a number
of absolutely erroneous statements, all designed to prove that
America, because of untimely pride, refused to manufacture air-
planes of British and French designs and to profit by the experi-
ence accumulated by the British and French prior to America's
entry into the World War. Says this great British leader, (whose
memoirs, valuable and thrilling as they are, might have been closer
to the truth had he confined his criticism to British matters, with
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which he was familiar), "They (the Americans) considered that it
would be a reflection. upon American inventiveness and ingenuity
merely to keep to European patterns (of airplanes). They must
have something original to send to Europe."
Forgetful even of the conferences in which he personally par-
ticipated, forgetful that the fundamentals of America's aeronautical
policy in Europe were determined in collaboration with Britishers
designated by and representing him, forgetful that Amnerica's aero-
nautical policy was restricted by the scarcity of ocean tonnage and
based upon other factors with which the British and Americans
agreed in absolute harmony of thought, Lloyd George ends his
statement with the sneer, "when the Armistice was signed, November
11th, half the airplanes used by the American Army were of French
and British make." (Incidentally, very few were British, as we
shall observe later.) The situation upon which Lloyd George thus
comments was as much the conception of him and his staff, as it
was of the Americans. Also, it is a fact that had British information
and advice concerning the usefulness of night bombardment air-
planes not been so incorrect and short-sighted both in the Spring and
in June of 1917, greater destruction from the air by American built
airplanes would have been visited upon the enemy's industrial and
military resources.
Previous to entering the war, the United States lacked both
experience and preparation in aeronautics. When the war in Europe
began, our country ranked fourteenth among the nations of the
world in amounts appropriated for aviation. Our appropriations
had been less than those of China, Bulgaria, Brazil and Spain.
Although the development of the airplane was rapid during 1914-
1917 under the intense pressure of war, when America entered we
were entirely without experience in the creation of airplanes for
warfare.
America had not built a single plane fitted for use in battle.
No American factory had made more than an unsuccessful experi-
mental attempt at creating battle planes. We had, up to that period,
made a few types of small engines and a few training planes. Our
country had never even owned service planes such as were then
being used in Europe.
Our Army Air Service appropriation had for years been run-
ning only from $150,000 to $300,000 a year. From 1908 to 1916
a total of but 59 airplanes of all types and for all purposes had been
delivered to our Army. The nations involved in the World War,
operating under the stress of war-time necessity, had spent vast
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sums for the designing, engineering and producing of airplanes and
the creation of aircraft industries of war-time proportions in their
respective countries.
Precisely what had been accomplished in aeronautics by the
different warring nations, was unknown to the United States.
Through fear that we might enter the war against them or otherwise
aid their enemies, none of the warring powers had been willing to
allow us to learn the details of its war-time aeronautical accomplish-
ments. Our military observers in each of the warring countries
were deliberately kept in ignorance. Therefore when our country
declared war against Germany, we found ourselves with no definite
idea of what to build for use on the western front, nor of the engi-
neering and performance characteristics of the airplanes, engines
and accessories essential for efficient action, either at the time we
declared war, or by the time it would be possible for us to have an
American Army under the American flag in Europe.
In the spring of 1917, each of the Allied nations hastened to
send civil and military missions to the United States to tell America
how to manage its part in the World War. Ideas in each of these
missions differed vastly. We had hoped they would bring us definite
information concerning the types of material we must supply for the
World War. We found their idea of what we should try to accom-
plish from the military standpoint almost at the bottom of the list
of things they then wanted of us.
By late May, 1917, after we had been at war for almost sixty
days, it became apparent that we could not secure useable aeronautical
information delivered to us in Washington from our Allies. We,
therefore, resolved to send a Joint Army and Navy Aircraft Mis-
sion to Europe to ascertain the answer to the two fundamental ques-
tions:-
1. What aeronautical material should we purchase in Europe
for the use of our troops, and
2. What aeronautical material should we attempt to build in the
United States both for ourselves and for our Allies?
This mission was to discover "what" we were to make in this
country and not "how much" we were to produce. "How much"
we were to attempt originally to produce had already and previously
been settled with the rapid adoption by this country of the request
that the French Premier, Ribot, had made in a cable of May 24,
1917, calling upon America to furnish for use on the western front a
larger Air Force than any country had ever possessed -4,500 air-
planes with 5,000 pilots and 50,000 mechanics. This cable added
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that, in order to maintain this quantity of airplanes in service on
the western front, the further production of 2,000 airplanes and
4,000 engines per month would be required solely for replacement
purposes. Even as early as the end of May, 1917, the American
Government had adopted this French estimate of quantity as a
manufacturing target at which this nation would shoot. The "time
element" then thought to have been set by the French government
(but since believed to have been inserted in the cable by an over-
zealous member of the French Mission in America) namely, "To
be at the front by the spring of 1918," could not be determined by
America at that date, as we then lacked knowledge both as to what
aircraft to build and how to build them. Much of the necessary
manufacturing knowledge was in the hands of the individual work-
men in overseas factories in which manufacturing methods, blue
prints, specifications, tolerances, etc., were all handled in ways
foreign to the American practice. The Allies in some cases could
not, and in other cases would not, give us the information to permit
our immediately starting the program. Hence we had to send a
mission to Europe to get the necessary information.
A further complication was the fact that manufacturers in
France and England customarily were charging each other royal-
ties on the various types of aircraft, aircraft engines, and acces-
sories. In the spring of 1917, their sales agents streamed into
Washington attempting to sell to the United States Government,
on a royalty basis, European ideas on the construction of war
materials. As Howard E. Coffin, of the then Council of National
Defense, said at the time. "to ask America to pay to the Allies
a royalty on the construction of Allied war materials, was to ask
us to pay an entrance fee to get into the war in order to help the
Allies toward victory."
Our mission consisted of two Army aeronautical engineers, two
officers of the Navy, a number of civilian industrial experts, and
93 skilled mechanics and factory experts. We planned to place the
latter in Allied factories for the purpose of securing, at first hand,
practical information regarding methods of manufacture which
could not readily be embodied in written plans and specifications.
This mission was headed by Raynal Cawthorne Boiling. It was
fortunate that the Army officer, who normally might have headed
the mission, was intelligent enough to realize that he was not only
too young to act as the mission's leader, but also lacked the requisite
training in international business negotiations. He realized, with
the complicated questions pertaining to royalties, etc., that it would
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be necessary to have a qualified civilian to act as a business leader.
Thus, Boiling was chosen to head the mission. He had not only had
experience as the commander of the First Aero Squadron, New
York National Guard, but he was also one of the senior attorneys in
the United States Steel Corporation. It was mainly because of this
latter training that he was chosen.
While the leaders of our small Army Air Service realized that
they had insufficient knowledge to start immediately to build the
small size, higly maneuverable types of airplanes necessary for
daylight fighting on the western front, they did feel, even as early
as April, 1917, that America could and should build a type of
large night bomber if only we could get the design from the Allies.
Our War Department cabled Great Britain asking whether America
should start building the then best type of their large night bomb-
ing machines, the Handley-Paige. We were greatly surprised to
receive in reply a cablegram from England advising us not to build
any night bombers or any large bombing planes of any type, saying
that they were of but little value in the European war.
The mission headed by Bolling (then Major, later Colonel)
sailed from New York on June 17, 1917, and arrived in London
on June 26, 1917. The very next morning Bolling and I met with the
entire British Air Board. In this session, the British reiterated their
advice that large bombardment airplanes were of little or no value in
the war. They were unanimous in advising that America should not
build any such type of airplanes. This advice was a shock to us; we
could neither understand nor believe their reasoning. However,
we tried to feel that the British, having had three years' experience
in the war should know whereof they spoke.
We then asked the British what they would advise. They
advised that America should build in the United States only such
airplanes as were already sufficiently advanced, either in the prac-
tical or experimental stages, as to be of value on the front at the
time when the completed airplanes could reach the front in quantity.
To do otherwise would be to build airplanes that would be valueless
in the already rapidly changing type of aerial warfare. We asked for
British cooperation. This the Air Board gave gladly and unstint-
ingly. Sir William Wier, then civilian head of the British aero-
nautical production activities, was designated as the man with whom
the Americans should consult.
Members of the Boiling Mission were temporarily assigned to
observe various British activities. Within five days, the mission,
thanks to marvelous British cooperation, had made a quick examina-
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tion of that which Great Britain had to offer and had selected the
outstanding airplanes, engines, and accessories which they felt
America should consider constructing for war-time use. Bolling
and I met frequently with Sir William Wier endeavoring to procure
samples, drawings, specifications, etc., of each item chosen for prompt
shipment to the United States.
The British Air Board and Sir William Wier raised the ques-
tion of how much royalty America would pay to the British manu-
facturers whose ideas might be copied. Bolling very promptly replied
that the United States would pay no royalty saying that it was not
our intention "to pay an entrance fee to enter the war." Bolling then
proposed a mutual exchange of manufacturing rights for the
duration of the war insofar as they concerned the construction of
aircraft and aircraft accessories pertaining to the Allied program.
He reminded the British of the much needed raw material that
America could supply and of the potential new engine (later known
as the Liberty engine) which America even then was designing. We
found Sir William Wier a very broad minded man. He placed
victory ahead of American dollars. He saw the advisability and
logic of Bolling's statement and agreed that the principle of mutual
exchange of manufacturing rights could be arranged with all of
England's manufacturers except Rolls Royce.
The Rolls Royce Company had until then held to an attitude
which seemed to us to be distinctly arbitrary. They would tell
our mission nothing, and would do nothing to help us build the
Rolls Royce aeronautical engine unless royalties satisfactory to
them were paid. All our arguments, to the effect that what the
United States was striving to do was to help win the war, were in
vain. They contended that they wanted their royalties or they
would not assist us even though it was to be assumed that they
then had the best airplane engine and that America's construction
of this engine might help shorten the war.
Since the British Aid Board was, of itself, unable to put into
effect the principle of a mutual exchange of manufacturing rights for
the duration of the war, Bolling, assisted and advised by our
Ambassador, Mr. Walter Hines Page, and Sir William Wier,
carried the matter on July 1, 1917, to David Lloyd George, Prime
Minister of England. Lloyd George said that America and Eng-
land could talk about royalties after the fighting was over, accepted
the principle of a mutual exchange of manufacturing rights for the
duration of the war, and instructed Sir William Wier to ship to
the United States such samples of aeronautical material and send
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such information as we might request. There was one exception to
the acceptance of this principle, namely, the Rolls Royce engine.
The British government at this date did not feel able to demand of
the Rolls Royce Company that it conform to the principle of no
royalty and so advised the Boiling mission, which in turn was
forced to advise the United States that any arrangement with the
Rolls Royce Company would have to be apart from this basic
understanding with England.
In its European investigations of Allied engines, the Bolling
Mission then found no engines of large horsepower so impressive
as the Rolls Royce. This engine the mission believed highly desir-
able for manufacture in the United States. Even before the mission
departed from Washington, the United States Aircraft Production
Board had attempted to have representatives sent to America from
the British Rolls Royce factory and to get from England the draw-
ings of the Rolls Royce engine in order that we might start Rolls
Royce engine production in the United States. The attempt was
unsuccessful. As the British government was not in a position
to force the Rolls Royce company to give America the drawings
from which to manufacture this engine and to force the Rolls Royce
company to concede to the United States the right to manufacture
their engine without the payment of royalties, the British frankly
stated to the Bolling Mission that the' United States would have to
make, direct with the Rolls Royce company, such agreement as could
be made. They further advised us that the Rolls Royce engine was
extremely difficult to manufacture,. that it was a very fine engine but
difficult to maintain in the field, and that America must realize that
American production of this engine probably would not be very
large. They stated further that, if America would allow the Rolls
Royce representatives to come to the United States and manufacture
these engines over and above the regular United States production
program, the British government would join with the United States
in utilizing all of the Rolls Royce engines so manufactured. Due
to the difficulty of manufacture, the English aircraft production
program for the Rolls Royce engine for the coming twelve months
was not expected to be sufficiently large.
The Boiling Mission actually cabled the United States recom-
mending the production of the Rolls Royce engine in the United
States in addition to all contemplated production of the Liberty
engine. After many attempts by our Air Service in Washington
to get the Rolls Royce representatives to manufacture their engine
in the United States, the United States was informed by the Rolls
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Royce company that the cost to our government would be extremely
high and production would be extremely low. During the delay
which occurred while attempting to satisfy the Rolls Royce company,
the Liberty engine had progressed to a stage which showed it to be
certain of success, certain of a cheaper price, and certain of a much
larger production. The Liberty engine had slightly higher horse-
power and slightly less weight per horsepower than did the Rolls
Royce. It also had fewer parts. This made it much simpler for
large production and more dependable in the field.
Otherwise the work of the mission in England proceeded swiftly.
To save time in getting the selected articles en route while we were
still negotiating in Europe, Sir William Wier, on June 28, 1917, had
already agreed to our request to ship to the United States each
article we selected as a sample. He did this at this early date simply
upon my giving him my word of honor that the United States would
not make use of any of these articles so shipped until an agreement
between the British and the Americans on the subject of royalties
was definitely settled. With the hearty cooperation of the British,
the mission, in five days was able to finish its task in England, and
left for France on July 2, 1917. By July 4, 1917, every item
requested of the British had been crated and had arrived at Liver-
pool ready for shipment to the United States.
Whenever our mission shipped, or requested for shipment, a
model aircraft, aircraft engine or aircraft accessory, it tried to
ship one completed article, one disassembled article but with its parts
in assembled form, and one article with the parts in manufactured
but unassembled form; the drawings, as nearly complete as the
Europeans had them; statements of specifications for material and
tolerances; and in general, as far as possible, everything needed by
a manufacturer to build the article. On articles recommended for
manufacture in the United States, we asked the European manu-
facturers to send one or more of their own factory experts to help
in the United States. Wherever possible our mission placed in the
European factories one or more of its American experts that they
might absorb all that could possibly be learned before returning to
the United States with the information..
In the brief period spent in England, the Bolling mission had
investigated aircraft in existence, those in the experimental stage, and
those still on the drawing board; had held a series of conferences
with the British Air Board; had discussed the American aircraft
program and obtained British advice thereon; had received from the
British much advice concerning the size of the aircraft program
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they thought desirable both in the United States and in Europe;
had negotiated, made arrangements, and even settled the linen ques-
tion to which we shall refer in a moment and which, up to that
moment, had given the Allies so much difficulty; had made arrange-
ments to train American flyers in British schools; and had made
and recommended to the United States reciprocal arrangements for
American flyers in Canadian schools and of Canadian flyers in
American schools. It had, in general, handled the many complicated
problems necessary for getting the American aircraft program
started.
The linen question was but one example of many problems that
had to be negotiated. There was, at that time, a distinct world
shortage of airplane linen. Almost the entire world's supply of satis-
factory linen then came from Ireland, and the physical impossibility
of sufficiently increasing nature's crops was apparent. If the
Americans were then intending, as they were, to undertake an air-
craft program, there was not available or in sight sufficient linen to
permit the construction of the required number of safe airplanes.
This meant that the British had to authorize a certain quantity of
Irish linen for use on United States airplanes and had to reduce,
just as America would have to, the safety factor in certain of their
experimental and training planes. This was done by using cotton on
certain parts of certain planes when linen was not available, though
increased loss of life might ensue.
The British made no attempt to "grab off" all the money they
could from the Americans. They were heart-and-soul interested in
winning the war. Instead of trying to sell us nothing but British
products, the Air Board, as a body and individually, advised the
Boiling Mission that it should not make any final decisions as to
what America should build until after it had visited the other Allied
countries. They gave us their best advice and left us free to make
our final decisions, offering in the meantime all possible help and
support.
In France, we met a totally different attitude. The senior
members of our mission arrived in Paris about 2 a. m. on July 2,
1917. That morning, Bolling and I were received by the French
Air Minister. He was thoughtful enough to send a car to bring
us to the Air Ministry. The chauffeur met us at our hotel. Within
the first block he had three accidents. Within the first fifty feet he
collided with another car. The voluble arguments which arose were
hushed when the other driver saw the uniforms of the Americans
in the French car. A few feet farther on, our driver crashed into
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still another car; there followed another argument even more
voluble. Next, he struck a man riding a bicycle. We then left the
car and hired a taxi.
The Air Minister uttered many polite words and, after an
appropriate exchange of amenities on both sides, designated his
assistant to conduct negotiations with us. We proceeded to the
assistant's office where we were introduced to three or four other
assistants of lesser rank. We were soon informed that the French
had done a tremendous amount of work to get ready for our arrival,
but, said they, since the subject was so broad and so complicated,
they had decided that they could discuss but one subject per day and
even that subject must be agreed upon by the previous day in order
that they might properly prepare for their discussion of it. We
argued that the items necessary to the making of an Air Force
were so numerous that, if we took up but one item per day we
would spend the rest of our lives discussing what we were going to
do-in fact, we said, the war would have been ended and others been
fought before we would be ready to fight. This seemed to make
no difference to the French who determined that the subject of the
next morning would be upon airplanes. So the following morning,
Bolling and I met the French to discuss airplanes. After a full day
of discussion, the French elected to discuss engines the following
day. So it went, one item per day, each day resulted in a mass of
talk, and we got nowhere rapidly. This continued for fourteen
fruitless days.
Previous to our arrival in Paris, the French Air Ministry had
made up their minds as to what they were going to force America
to do for its aeronautical program. The French concentrated all
their thought and schemes upon trying to force us to place a
contract in France for approximately 20,000 airplanes and 30,000
engines, and to sign that contract immediately without giving further
thought to the value of British or Italian aircraft or giving any
thought to what we might want to build in America. It is of passing
interest to note that, in spite of the efforts put forth by the French
in July of 1917 to force us to purchase 20,000 airplanes from them,
France fell down on the purchase contract we did make with them
on August 30, 1917. This contract called for the delivery of but
5,000 airplanes-only 25%7 of what they, only 45 days before, had
impressed upon us they were capable of producing for America.
After we had been in Paris for about a week an Italian mission
arrived to see us. They invited us to visit Italy. We then felt,
since our main activities would undoubtedly be on the western front
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and since we were not yet at war with Austria, that we were not
justified in taking the time to go to Italy.
Especially did we feel a need to conserve time in view of the
existing submarine situation, which was most critical. In the first
audience with Lloyd George, the greater part of the time was spent
in discussing the submarine. The Allies were losing to the sub-
marine 500,000 to 800,000 tons of shipping a month, more tonnage
than they were able to build or otherwise obtain. All war plans,
as well as food for the people in the British Isles, were vitally
affected. All Allied military activities seemed to be facing a limita-
tion because of the scarcity of tonnage for the transportation of raw
materials. A real food shortage threatened and food was being
dispensed under government restrictions. When we first arrived
in London, we had paid our respects to Ambassador Page. Though
we were there on a definite aeronautical mission, Ambassador Page
reviewed the entire submarine situation, pointing out the perilous
straits of England and how bad the British needed help to suppress
the submarine. Lloyd George informed us that the war would be
over in Germany's favor in three or four months if the German
submarine was not curbed. He urged Bolling to cable to the
United States asking that additional destroyers be sent immediately
to help stop the undersea ships. Our first cablegrams to the United
States dealt mainly with the need of assistance for handling the
submarine menace rather than with aeronautical problems.
After many fruitless meetings and discussions with the French,
we devoted our main efforts towards trying to get them to ship
certain sample aircraft to the United States (the British had already
done so) in order to conserve time by having the sample aircraft
transported while we were'talking. The French finally promised
they would ship to the United States on the following day each
aircraft, aircraft engine, and aircraft accessory then under con-
sideration. Thus, on July 6, 1917, we cabled the United States to
expect samples which would be shipped by the next boat. By July
7th, it developed the French had not started to ship any samples to
us, and apparently did not then intend to ship any samples. Instead,
they were still devoting their energies to attempting to get us to sign
an order for the purchase of all our aircraft equipment in France.
After all this we were ready to reconsider the Italian invitation.
We concluded that to make the French assist us, we would have to
take drastic action. Therefore, when the Italian mission returned
to Paris, this time with its ranks reinforced with more outstanding
personalities, including a direct representative of the King, we
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promised to leave immediately on a visit to Italy. We expressed to
the French our regret over the delay which had taken place in Paris.
We said that we were proceeding to Italy to study what the Italians
had to present. And we asserted that we felt the delays in France
would force us to make our selection of airplanes to be built by our
government from among British or Italian types - or both.
What a thunder of condemnation fell upon our heads from the
French press. Articles appeared damning the individual members
of the Boiling mission, alleging that its industrialists were not
interested in anything except spending American millions in Ameri-
can factories, stating that the United States had six hundred and
forty million dollars to spend for aviation, that the industrialists of
the mission expected to spend all of this money in the United States,
and demanding that America should spend this money in France.
Naturally, we made no comment. When French officials mentioned
the news articles, we politely indicated that we had been ready and
willing to do our part toward winning the war, but that we had
been delayed by the French and, so far, had been prevented from
accomplishing in France one single thing. We also indicated that,
in England, we had accomplished all that was necessary in our first
five days there. We stated that, judging from the attitude of the
Italians, we felt we might get equal speed and results in Italy.
On July 15, 1917, the senior members of the Boiling mission
left Paris for Italy, spent approximately ten days there and returned
to Paris on July 27, 1917. One of our consuls in Italy told us that
we were the "first commercial mission from the United States to
Italy since 1853."
We were astounded at the aeronautical material available in
Italy. It was far better than we had ever hoped to inspect.
The Italians had been greatly handicapped throughout the entire
war by lack of raw materials of the kind and quality necessary to
build airplanes. Prior to the war, Germany had forced Italy to be
in many respects dependent on her. Germany had furnished to
Italy coal, iron, and many other raw materials, as well as machine
tools and instruments, such as telescopic sights, cameras and range
finders. Germany also had controlled Italy's banks and most of the
Italian newspapers. During the year preceding Italy's alignment
with the Allies, Germany shut off all supplies and all banking aid
within her control. France and England would then furnish no
assistance until they knew Italy's intentions. The Italians had
found it necessary to organize banks of their own, start newspapers
of their own, create factories for the manufacture of magnetos,
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optical instruments, cameras, machine tools, and to render them-
selves independent of Germany. No wonder we were amazed at
what we found in Italy. We were struck with the fact that neither
the British nor the French were then sufficiently informed to give
to the Italians the credit due them. Their progress in aviation had
been outstanding. In the first year of the war, their aeronautical
status was as bad as our own. Yet in the summer of 1917 both their
production and development activities were better organized than
were those of the French and perhaps quite as well as those of the
English. Their larger motor factories were very much like Ameri-
can establishments - more so than anything we had seen elsewhere
in Europe. The heads of their establishments compared favorably
with our most energetic business men. There was complete har-
mony between the civil and the military personnel. It was inspiring
to see what they had accomplished, especially so because they lacked
more in natural resources and raw materials than did any of the
other warring nations.
Before our arrival in Italy, in order to save our time, the Italians
had prepared and boxed for shipment to the United States one or
two of each of their principal types of airplanes. When we asked
that they be shipped at once in order that we might save time by
having them en route even while considering their desirability, they
agreed. They gave us completed drawings - in fact everything
we requested. If we suggested that we wanted any particular thing,
they immediately wired their Section Technique Aeronautical to
prepare it for us and they delivered it to us before we left the
country. We told them we would pay no royalty. After some
hesitation they agreed. They did say, however, that, in return for
their assistance, they would like America's help in one thing; they
wanted the Bolling mission to persuade the United States to sell
to the Italians raw material of the kind and quality necessary for
their aeronautical program - a legitimate request with which we
were only too eager to attempt to comply.
We were much impressed by the success the Italians were
having with their Caproni airplane. The Italians were alone at
that time in official approval of large bombardment airplanes, and
were using them on the front with some apparent success. Our
observations of Italy's success with large airplanes was totally
different from the report we had received in England. When we
asked the Italians to send a Caproni airplane to the United States
together with all the information thereon in order that we might
consider its construction in the United States, they promptly agreed.
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We left Italy with a sense of highest regard for the Italians
not only as individuals, but also as a nation. The full story of the
trip of the Boiling mission through northern Italy should someday
be written for the benefit of the American people. The members
of our mission were afforded every opportunity to see what they
wanted to see, and were treated in a courteous and cooperative
manner. Every one in Italy, from the King down, cooperated to
make the trip effective. And all at little cost to us. This was
very pleasing to the Army and Navy members of our mission,
for they were serving a government which had sent them to Europe
allowing them in Europe but seven cents a mile traveling expenses
and, when not traveling, nothing. The result of this was that
regular service members of the mission who had contacts with the
Allies were either "broken or badly bent" before our work was half
finished. The personal pocketbooks of Raynal C. Bolling and
Howard C. Marmon had to be tapped in order that some might
eat. The Italians' generous help in paying the mission's expenses
enabled all the Americans to travel where some of them would not
have had the cash to go.
When the French, upon our return, heard the glowing tributes
paid by us to Italian and British aviation, they changed their attitude
and finally got down to business. In a few days we were able to
arrive at our conclusions as to the value of the various forms of
materiel available in French aeronautics.
By the end of July, the mission determined what types of air-
planes and engines were best suited to the American Army.
Bolling then invited to a meeting in Paris on July 31, 1917, the
British, French and Italian aviation experts that they might discuss
with our mission and with each other what materiel America should
buy in Europe and what should be built in the United States. Each
of the three overseas nations attended this meeting with its senior
commanders and other appropriate personnel both from its home
office and from its front lines. There were present the civilian
head, the operative military head, the technical head, and the supply
head of each of the British, French, Italian and American Air Forces.
Colonel Bolling presented to this gathering of nations our ideas for
the American program. After a full day's discussion, to the
delight of the American delegation and to the complete surprise of
the Allies themselves, All jealousies were laid aside and the meeting
adjourned with an unanimous recommendation on exactly what air-
planes, engines and accessories America should buy in Europe and
build in the United States for each of the different needs of America's
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military aviation. The program was approved in full by all heads
of the A.E.F. Air Service. We were then able to present, to General
Pershing in Europe and to the War Department in Washington, a
program which had unanimous Allied and American approval.
The British and Italians authorized us to proceed on a basis of
mutual exchange of manufacturing rights for the duration of the
war.
The French delayed shipping the samples of their materiel
to the United States. In fact, the Spad pursuit plane, which it was
agreed America should copy, was not shipped from France until
August 28, 1917. We were unable to ship complete Spad drawings
because there were none. We, therefore, shipped three Spad
machines, one complete, one disassembled to show finished parts,
and one comprising a combination of parts not completely assembled.
The Spad did not arrive in the United States until the 18th of
September, 1917. The major cause of this delay was the French
demand for royalties. Fortunately, the French mind had been so
well diagnosed in the United States before the Boiling mission sailed
for Europe that the American Aircraft Production Board had
agreed, in order to expedite the obtaining of material from Europe,
that it would pay $100,000.00 for each of six articles to the owner of
the rights. Unfortunately, this information became known to the
Joffre mission in Washington and the French government was so
cabled by its aviation officers on the Joffre mission. The French
government had permitted their manufacturers to believe that each
manufacturer, if he gave any information to the United States,
would get $100,000. Finally, in an effort to expedite the shipments
Bolling agreed that the United States would pay $100,000 to each
of several manufacturers. Some of the French wanted even more
for some of their articles and deliberately delayed shipments in an
effort to get more. Bolling impressed upon them that the various
$100,00 checks were not to be paid as royalties but were to be paid
to inspire the French to make greater haste to help America to aid
in winning the war. After prolonged delay, Bolling took the position
that, in view of time lost, he would no longer offer the $100,000 to
expedite shipment but thereafter would pay the $100,000 only for
each of such airplanes as were actually constructed in quantity in
the United States. This is but one incident among others where the
French put the American dollars ahead of a vigorous push for
victory.
During the month of August, 1917, while all the delay in shipping
the Spad was taking place, the second battle of Verdun was fought
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and this Spad, which had4 been chosen by the unanimous vote of all
the Allies at the July 31st conference, became obsolete even before
it reached the French sea coast for shipment to the United States.
No final agreement as to royalties was ever reached with the
French. In due course of time, the subject was dropped. The French
said no more about it but simply sold us what we wanted. When
later we chose for manufacture articles designed by a French indi-
vidual, such as a camera or a new type oxygen outfit, we sometimes
agreed to pay a royalty direct to the individual owner since the
French government could not or would not commandeer the article
for us.
In 1917, our American engineers and factories were faced with
organizing a new industry. Unfortunately, there was no aircraft
industry in the United States when we entered the war. The War
Department was not finally informed until our cablegram of July 31,
1917, as to the types of airplanes needed for fighting in the European
war. It was not until sometime in August that copies of the British
planes could be started in the United States. Likewise, the Italians,
despite their genuine effort to make prompt shipments, could not get
their Caproni to the United States until September 18, 1917.
So, when General Pershing wired in February, 1918, that no
American airplanes had yet reached Europe, he was not wiring that
America had for ten months failed to supply him with American
airplanes. He was wiring that six months had gone without any
copies of British and Italian planes reaching Europe and five months
had transpired without receiving in Europe any copies of French
planes.
All such copies of all recommended "daylight" planes would
have been obsolete upon their arrival on the western front. Models
changed frequently in that fight for world supremacy.
During the war, aircraft design advanced so rapidly that the
British used for single-seater pursuit planes, 27 different advanced
types; the French, 31 types; the Italians, 13 types; the Germans,
12 types. To illustrate how rapidly any one type of pursuit plane
was necessarily altered, it is interesting to note that the French, at
the end of the war, were using a Spad twelve designs advanced over
the type of the Spad that the Boiling Mission, with the advice and
agreement of all the Allies, had recommended to the United States
on July 31, 1917. The French Spad was redesigned an average of
once a month for the whole time that America was in the war. This
certainly shows the futility of America's attempting to make single-
seater pursuit planes so far from the battle front and illustrates why
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our flyers in Europe were supplied mainly with airplanes constructed
in Europe-at the scene of action.
As to two-place pursuit airplanes, the British used in the war,
5 types; the French, 10 types; the Italians, 1 type; the Germans,
3 types. England changed types of her observation airplanes during
the war 20 times; France used 22 types; Italy, 11 types; and Ger-
many, 10 types. As to day bombers, the British developed 10
advanced types; France changed her types 7 times; Italy, 4 times.
Of night bombers, the British developed 10 types; the French, 4
types; the Italians, 7 types; and the Germans, 6 types.
Types of airplanes required for the fronts changed more rapidly
than women's millinery. This explains why America should have
built only that limited requirement of daylight plans which our
A.E.F. would require should the British and French quit fighting
or be defeated and America be left to fight its way out of Europe
alone or with perhaps our former Allies as our enemies-a not
unlikely situation and one that demanded and received consideration
in all our A.E.F. planning. This was America's only justification for
building and shipping any completed airplanes to Europe prior to
1919. To have done differently would have been a waste of our
then most precious item-tonnage.
In the summer of 1917, it became more and more evident to us
in the A.E.F., while retaining our faith in the ultimate success of
the American program for 1919, that it would not be possible to put
American made airplanes on the western front in the spring of 1918,
as Premier Ribot had presumably requested in his cablegram of
May 23, 1917.
Anyone who has had dealings with the American government
realizes that our own government is slow to move. Other govern-
ments are even more slow when dealing with foreigners whose
methods differ, whose standard of measurements differ, whose man-
ufacturing principles differ, who are regarded as commercial rivals,
and whose thoughts of what are fair regarding royalties and business
differ. There was an unexpected delay in getting from Allied govern-
ments complete plans of what this country should build. The gov-
ernments themselves did not have the full information. What they
did have did not fit into American manufacturing methods. Our
June and July, 1917, investigations in England, France and Italy
taught us that, based on the experience of the very best of European
manufacturers, delays must be expected before quantity production
of satisfactory war-time material could be put into active service on
the front. While we believed that as soon as America "got going"
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it could probably manufacture more rapidly than could the European
factories, we recognied that, even if America did two or three times
as good a job as the experienced European factories were then doing,
it would be July 1, 1918 before any American built aircraft could
appear in the Allied countries. And with the scarcity of shipping,
aggravated by the German submarine menace, there was no telling
how much delay there would be in getting our aircraft to Europe
even after they were manufactured. It was almost impossible to
see where sufficient tonnage could be obtained for the purpose-a
fear that before the end of 1918 became a reality. By Armistice
day, America had completed airplanes at seaboard and insufficient
tonnage to move them to Europe.
What is even more important, and what the American public
probably has never properly understood, is the fact that we were
dependent upon our Allies to keep on fighting and to prevent a
German victory while we were getting ready to fight. It would have
done us no good to build a large Air Force in 1918, even if we
could have done so, if we deprived the Allies of the necessary raw
materials with which to continue fighting. We were convinced that
the greatest and surest contribution the United States could make
towards the joint Allied air warfare was to render every possible
assistance to each of our Allies in carrying out the aircraft program
of each. Each of our Allies had in the field large, well organized,
well trained, and experienced Air Forces which they planned greatly
to augment during 1918. The American Air Force had yet to be
created, yet to be trained, and, in fact, yet to be organized. Our first
duty, undoubtedly, was successfully to support our Allies who were
actually carrying on a war until we could get ready to take our part.
Therefore, it was essential that our program of production and train-
ing should not be permitted to interfere in any way with the program
of the Allies and that assistance to the Allies should take priority
over our own needs.
Our assistance was vital in three forms:-
1. We must furnish raw and semi-finished material, of much
of which there was a shortage, from the United States.
2. It was desirable to develop, as soon as possible, a plan of
producing, in great quantity, in the United States, finished parts for
airplanes common to the programs of our Allies and of ourselves.
Both the Allies and ourselves, during our negotiations, arrived at the
conclusion that, if this plan promptly and effectively could be estab-
lished, it would not only do much to relieve the problem of trans-
portation by reducing the ocean tonnage required for the transport
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of airplane material, but it would so relieve the English, French and
Italian factories of primary manufacturing operations as to permit
them greatly to increase their output of finished airplanes.
3. We must produce a large quantity of large engines, for, in
1917 and even until the very termination of the war, engine pro-
duction was the limiting factor in the English, French and Italian
manufacturing programs. All were unanimous in deciding that, if
America could finish the necessary engines, all the Allied countries
could increase their output of airplanes.
For America. to adopt this three point policy would be self-
denying. But unless we did so, it was admitted that the Allies could
not hope to carry on until American help in the air would become
effective. It must be remembered that there was a world shortage
of vital raw materials for the construction of airplanes. Spruce,
linen and dope were outstanding items in this category.
However, if American built airplanes could not be counted on
prior to July of 1918, what was the American Army on the western
front to do for aircraft? We examined the production resources of
England, France and Italy. We found that England with an air
program larger than anything theretofore accomplished by her, could
be counted on to give us little or no assistance. Italy, though suc-
cessfully organized, was operating on a small scale and we could
draw upon her to a limited extent only. In France, however, there
were possibilities of manufacturing expansion, together with the
necessary experience in design and construction, that would serve
the American needs until American industry could get under way,
provided the United States would and could supply the raw materials
and some machine tools. So, on August 30, 1917, we drew a contract
with the French (signed for the United States by General Pershing
and for France by Daniel Vincent, under Secretary of State for
Military Aeronautics) covering 5,000 airplanes and 8,500 engines
to meet the requirements of the American Expeditionary Forces in
airplanes, engines, and all aeronautical accessories for the coming
year. The deliveries under this contract were to be completed by
June 1, 1918. On its part, the United States was to furnish by
November 1, 1917, certain specified tools and raw materials necessary
to the ultimate fulfillment of the French obligation. The contract
also provided that such of the airplanes and engines as were to be
furnished by the French by February 1, 1918, would be supplied
even though the United States should be unable to deliver, as
scheduled, its quota of material and tools. It was upon the pro-
visions of this agreement that the Air Service, American Expe-
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ditionary Forces, planned its program of training and of placing
aero squadrons on the fighting front. Therefore, in construing
General Pershing's telegram which we have referred to, it is to be
noted that neither the Allies nor the authorities of the American
Expeditionary Forces, in planning the American air program for the
western front, based any plans upon American built airplanes being
received in Europe as early as February of 1918.
While it is true that both the Americans and French failed
properly to perform this particular contract, that there were recrim-
inations on both sides and that this contract was superseded by one
dated May 3, 1918, it is likewise true that America furnished in vast
quantities the materials and supplies that made possible the main-
tenance of the Allied Air Forces and finally resulted in their pre-
dominance by nearly 100 per cent on the western front. When hos-
tilities ceased on November 11, 1918, the Allies had 6784 airplanes
at the front against the enemy's 3352. And so far as our Allies'
performance of their obligations was concerned, at no time did they
fail properly to provide us with sufficient airplanes adequately to
serve our actual needs. When the Armistice was signed, we had of
airplanes and balloons, both from the Allies and manufactured in
the United States, not only a full complement for all the aero units
that we had been able to train and put on the fighting front, but also
ample reserves in our European depots.
A total of 5071 airplanes were received and paid for by
America from Allied sources. Of this number 2375 were service
planes used by the American forces in Europe. France, alone, sold
and delivered to us 4791 airplanes (2065 training and 2186
service planes). An average of spare engines in the proportion
of one to four was maintained for service airplanes bought over-
seas. Our squadrons were furnished with quantities of spare parts
50% in excess of those furnished by the French to their own
similar units. In the light of the conditions which dictated the
policy we and our Allies unanimously adopted, it is obvious that
the popular story that we were forced to "borrow" our airplanes
from "bleeding France and stricken England" sacrifices facts
to sensationalism.
In carrying out this policy we did not, however, lose sight for
a moment of the goal of supplying our forces with American built
airplanes. In attaining that goal we were successful in that, and
to the extent that, materiel was available ahead of trained man
power to use it.
The first American built DH-4 airplane arrived in France from
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the United States on May 11, 1918. It, and all other American
built airplanes, had to be shipped from the seaports to the Air
Service Production Center No. 2 at Romorantin, France. This
Romorantin Depot received, uncrated, assembled, tested and
equipped with all the latest accessories the airplanes received from
America. On August 2, 1918, a squadron of 18 American built
airplanes (DH-4's), with Liberty engines, was used over the front
lines for the first time. At this date the Allied airplane strength was
5528 against the enemy's plane strength of 3309. Up to November
11, 1918, a a total of 1,216 American built airplanes and 2,083 Lib-
erty engines had been received overseas. Of this number, 1,087
airplanes were assembled and of this number 628 were dispatched
to the front. Of course, many also went to American training
centers. There were 196 American built airplanes in actual use at
the front on Armistice Day; we had serving in actual combat on
the western front twelve squadrons equipped with American built
planes, powered by Liberty engines. And in the American squad-
rons with our armies, there were a total of 740 American owned
planes on November 11.
The Liberty engine, in actual service, proved equal to the high-
est expectations of its designers and builders. Combining great
power with, for its day, unusual reliability and lightness of weight,
it was one of the most successful aeronautical engines ever pro-
duced. The confidence of the Allies in its performance was shown
by their eagerness to secure more Liberty engines than we were
able to furnish. The fact that it could be produced in great quan-
tity and that its spares were standardized, made it a most valuable
asset for the American and Allied Air Services. It was, perhaps,
the greatest single material contribution of the United States during
the War to aviation. Toward the end of the War, it was of more
value to the Allies than were even America's gold dollars to their
depleted treasuries.
So, in the end, we overcame delay and inexperience, lack of
tonnage and the barriers of an ocean. Aiding our Allies, and aided
by them, we concentrated upon winning the war. And so success-
fully did we execute our policy that in the crucial months from
July, 1918, on to the end, when our swift blows brought an un-
expectedly early termination to the holocaust, our own Army saw
the wings of planes from America, with engines designed and built
by American engineers and workmen, in the van of our advance.





TO THE NATIONAL AVIATION FORUM:
Civil Aviation is clearly recognized as the backlog of
national defense in the Civil Aeronautics Act which set up
the effective machinery for a comprehensive national policy
with respect to the air.
Underlying the statute is the principle that the country's
welfare in time of peace and its safety in time of war rests
upon the existence of a stabilized aircraft production -
an economically and technically sound air transportation
system, both domestic and overseas - an adequate supply
of well trained civilian pilots and ground personnel.
This new national policy set up by the Congress views
American aviation as a special problem requiring special
treatment. Aviation is the only form of transportation
which operates in a medium which knows no frontiers but
touches alike all countries of the earth. One fact which
stands out is that hardly another civil activity of our people
bears such a direct and intimate relation to the national
security as does civil aviation. It supplies a reservoir of
inestimable value to our military and naval forces in the
form of men and machines, while at the same time it keeps
an industry so geared that it can be instantly diverted to
the production of fighting planes in the event of national
emergency.
I hope the forthcoming National Aviation Forum will give
serious thought to the many phases which enter into aero-
nautics as a national problem.
FRANKLIN D. RoosEvELT
(Italics ours.)
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It was not to have been hoped in 1917 that this country could
start a new industry in five or six month's time even under the
pressure of war. As a matter of fact, if this country today should
find itself engaged in war, it would be more than six to nine months
before we could hope for any further appreciable reinforcement of
tactical for our Army and Navy Air Forces even if we should
order planes of types and models already in production. And if
we should order for the Army and Navy the construction of
already tested and proved contemplated advanced types of planes,
it would be at least a year before these planes could be available
for our fighting forces even though we were fighting on our own
soil and no question of ocean tonnage were involved.
There are certain classes of war-time materiel which cannot
be created over night, but which must be built in time of peace
and be ready at the outbreak of war. In the case of artillery and
similar durable items, these can and should be built in time of peace
and should be stored, ready for a war-time emergency. Such is
not true of aircraft, for aircraft not only become obsolete but
they deteriorate rapidly if kept in storage. Thus, our only salva-
tion, for properly designed aircraft and for the quantities of air-
craft needed by our military forces in time of war, is a properly
developed and mature aircraft industry existing in this country
at the outbreak of war. This America did not have when the
World War was declared. And even today we have it to but a
limited extent, despite the fact that the Baker board in 1934, all
other Federal boards and investigating bodies (of which there
have been fifteen in the last generation), and the President's special
messages to Congress from January 12, 1939, and onward have
all recommended a stronger aircraft industry as being essential for
national defense.
In looking back at a glorious period of our military history,
and in dissipating the false disparagement of the uninformed, let
us look forward too. Let us determine never again to be faced
with so herculean an undertaking as that which the Bolling mission
found to lie ahead in 1917. Let us provide, while there is time,
for an aircraft industry now which can meet the challenge when
it comes.
